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The Cash Nexus
by Carl E. Schneider

Ifyou

more than half the personal bankruptcies in the United States. Even insured
patients may find themselves paying for
uncovered services that can be both numerous and dear. Furthermore, managed care's effort to subdue health costs
by inducing doctors to save money has
been badly battered, and the new cry is
to give patients such inducements instead. "Consumer-directed health care"
makes patients consumers by asking
them to purchase insurance programs
shrewdly and by using high deductibles
(one to five thousand dollars) and health
savings accounts to make them purchase
specific treatments. In short, individual-Daniel Webster Cathell ly we must increasingly worry about
The Physician Himself buying care wisely, and nationally we
must worry about our latest adventure
ourts and legislatures have la- in financing health care.
So why should courts protect pabored for decades to protect patients' choice of medical treat- tients as consumers? You, dear conments, even though patients seize that sumer, should protect yourself (caveat
gift less eagerly than lawmakers expect. emptor) by evaluating what you buy,
Yet while courts have rushed to build and the market should protect you by
the whited sepulchre of informed con- disciplining vendors who compete for
sent, they have fled from a related prob- your business. Evangelists of consumerlem that patients actually yearn to solve directed health care fondly imagine just
and that actually can be ameliorated- such a market.
Really? You arrive at the doctor's ofthe plight of patients who perforce agree
to a treatment before they know its costs
fice or the hospital and are told to sign a
and who receive a bill both unrelated to contract. Like this:
the treatment's value and several times
In consideration of hospital services
what an insured patient would pay.
rendered to the patient, I jointly or
Increasingly, patients must be conseverally, do hereby agree to pay
sumers in the medical marketplace. This
Athens Regional Medical Center
frightens patients, and should. Medical
any and every account presented to
bills can be as alarming and baffling as
me, or us jointly or severally, for
medical ailments. The costs of illnesssaid service or services in accorparticularly medical bills--contribute to

attempt to shave too closely in
money matters--grabbing when a patient
... [is] so low that it is no longer decent to
take fees; or hungrily holding watches, jewelry, or other articles as security for payment of your fees; or compelling their
wounded or half-dead owners to pawn or
sell them for your benefit; or [being} . . .
too vigorous in your efforts to collect fees
from persons in na"ow circumstances[this] would not only be brutal barbarity,
but would be very apt to ... create a widespread community feeling of hostility
against you. ... It is almost better to be defrauded than to collect your fees by such
method ...
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dance with the rates and terms of
the hospital. 1
In other words, "Do you want help?
Sign a blank check. We'll fill it in later.
As we wish." You do want help, so you
sign. (And even if you don't, accepting
services binds you to pay for them.)
Consumer! You must shop for capable care at palatable prices. True, doctors
don't advertise prices. So you telephone:
''I'm a good consumer trying to direct
my health care. How expensive is Dr.
Jones?" Even if a human being answers,
even if the human being thinks this
question tolerable, what answer can you
fairly expect? Do you know how long
your visit will be? What services you will
need? Which of the myriad insurance
policies you have? If you don't knowand who does?-what doctor's staff can
predict the charges? (And finding out
fees is a dream compared to ascertaining
the quality of the doctor's work.)
Or you ask the clerk about the hospital's prices. The clerk has no idea and resents your impudence. You press up the
ladder. Still no idea, still more resentment. After you are discharged, you receive an ingeniously indecipherable bill
that no one will explain. Eventually, you
discover that bills are
determined according to the hospital's "Charge Master," a confidential
list of charges made by the hospital
for all its goods and services, which
is used to compute charges for all
private commercial patients who are
treated on a fee-for-service basis.
The Charge Master is compiled and
maintained by the hospital's chief
financial officer on the hospital's
computer system. In 1991, the
Charge Master contained approximately 295 pages and listed prices
for approximately 7,650 items [and
today it would usually be several
times that number]. The Charge
Master is considered confidential
proprietary information and is not
shown to anyone other than the officers and employees of the hospital
and authorized consultants. The
Charge Master is adjusted on a
weekly basis to reflect current cost
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data; the hospital's costs are marked
up by a mathematical formula designed to produce a targeted
amount of profit for the hospital. 2
Now another diablerie. Because your
insurance doesn't cover your treatment,
the hospital is charging two to four
times what it would pay an insurer for
what you received. The Wall Street journal described a patient treated two days
for a suspected heart attack, for whom
the "bill for the hospital stay totaled
$29,500. That bill did not include an
additional $6,800 from the cardiologist,
$1,000 for the ambulance ride, and
$7,500" for a stent. Had the patient
"been poor enough to qualifY for statesponsored healthcare through Medicaid,
the hospital would have accepted a payment of only $6,000 for the twenty-one
hour hospital stay, $1,000 for the cardiologist, and $165 for the ambulance
ride."
Of course, consumer, you should
have shopped better and taken your
business elsewhere. But how? First, your
hospital is typical; its infuriating practices are partly responses to incentives in
the health care system. Second, what
other suitable hospitals were available?
Third, you "chose" this hospital because
your doctor sent you there, and you
don't want to leave your doctor, since
you know and trust your doctor and
your doctor knows you. (In other
words, you've just discovered that medical institutions can have something like
monopoly power, even though they may
not be literal monopolies.)
The hospital is now your creditor.
The law (as it must) offers creditors
multiple ways to wrest money from
debtors, and hospitals have wielded
these tools impressively. So, the hospital
sues you to enforce its contract.
Can't you defend yourself by saying
that the hospital's charges are unfair?
This is where courts are so complaisant.
True, they won't enforce "unconscionable" contracts. True, courts have
other doctrines for moderating harsh
contracts. But courts dislike amending
contracts. First, contract law assumes
people can bargain for themselves and
know better than courts what they need.
12

Second, courts typically doubt their
competence to evaluate the fairness of
contractual exchanges. Third, if courts
often altered contracts, contracts would
lose much of their predictability and
hence much of their value.
So the court says that your contract
"unambiguously creates an obligation
for appellants to pay ARMC for hospital
services 'in accordance with the rates
and terms of the hospital."' The "plain
language of the contract leaves the discretion to set the rates solely with" the
hospital. The hospital exercised its discretion. Tough. What's more, your state
requires hospitals to summarize a few of
their charges on request. "Therefore,"
the state's policy "is that purchasers of
hospital services use this pricing information to compare hospital charges and
make cost effective decisions. This represents the ... [legislature's] decision to
let market forces control health care
costs ... "3
But isn't this a "contract of adhesion," a contract "which, imposed and
drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing
party only the opportunity to adhere to
the contract or reject it"? Alas, another
uphill battle. One mother signed a contract where the hospital "told me to sign,
so they would give [my son] medical
treatment because he needed it because
he was bleeding out of his ears, out of
his mouth, the bone out of his elbow
was sticking out through the skin." The
court managed to restrain its sympathy:
One can gather she was hurried and
under stress. She did not take the
time to read the contract. That was
no fault of the hospital. There was
no duress; there was no fraud practiced upon Mrs. Chamberlin. The
hospital ... could withhold its services unless and until Mrs. Chamberlin signed the agreement. It is
useless to speculate whether it
would have done so, just as it is useless to speculate whether Mrs.
Chamberlin would have signed the
agreement, knowing she was obligating herself to pay the hospital bill,
if the hospital had withheld its ser-

vices to her son until she had so
done. 4
But come closer, Starbuck; thou requirest a little lower layer. No doubt
your hospital treats patients the way an
airline treats passengers, but like the airline it isn't making monopoly profits; it's
squeezed by rising costs, thrifty governments, and hard-bargaining insurers. To
compensate for the good rates insurers
win for their patients, uninsured patients are charged (but don't necessarily
pay) dreadful rates. Courts may achieve
Dickensian levels of heartlessness ("And
the Union workhouses?" demanded
Scrooge. "Are they still in operation?"),
but judicially regulating the health care
market intelligently and effectively will
require subduing a Nemean lion.
Nevertheless, it should (in the standard judicial phrase) shock the conscience of the court when a hospital tells
the sick and dying, if you want our help
(and good luck finding anybody else's),
hand us your wallet, and you'll get back
what we choose to give; then submits
inexplicable and unexplained bills unrelated to any objective value of its services; and finally hustles the debtor off
to bankruptcy. Courts have doctrines
they can develop to curb egregious abuses of the law of contract, and they
should use them. But meanwhile, pay
up. And look forward to consumerdirected health care.
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